A recurring belief in Lebanese politics is that, when the decisive moment comes, a powerful patron will fight to protect us. Some place that hope in Washington, others in Tehran, and some look increasingly toward Beijing.

 

History teaches a harder lesson. Great powers support partners when doing so advances their interests, and they seek terms that safeguard those interests. Their assistance can be substantial—money, weapons, intelligence, diplomatic backing, even military force. But political friendship is not an unlimited promise to fight another country’s war.

 

Even treaty alliances, with their binding obligations, leave open questions of implementation, cost, and political resolve. For countries without such guarantees, the distinction between support and protection is even more consequential.

 

Consider the relationship between Washington and Beijing. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has announced an extension of the U.S.–China trade truce until January 10, 2027, giving both sides more time to pursue a broader economic agreement. The two powers are managing the costs of rivalry without resolving the strategic competition beneath it.

 

In the Arctic, the defense agreement signed by the United States, Denmark, and Greenland on September 22 offers another illustration. It provides for expanded American military access while affirming the Kingdom of Denmark’s sovereignty and Greenland’s right to self-determination. The agreement still requires approval by the Danish and Greenlandic parliaments. Washington stands to gain greater strategic reach without annexation, while Denmark and Greenland seek stronger collective security without surrendering sovereignty.

 

These arrangements differ in form, but they reveal a common logic: states bargain over interests. Smaller partners improve their position through the institutions they command, the contributions they can make, and the alternatives available to them.

 

Taiwan is often raised as a counterexample. Would the United States not fight China to defend it? It might. But that decision would involve far more than sympathy for a fellow democracy. Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, strategic location, and role in the regional balance weigh heavily in American calculations.

 

The Taiwan Relations Act provides for support to Taiwan’s self-defense and makes maintaining the capacity to resist coercion a matter of U.S. policy. It does not guarantee automatic military intervention. The distinction matters: a strong American interest in Taiwan’s security is not the same as an unconditional commitment to war.

 

Nor does strategic importance eliminate vulnerability. Taiwan has democratic institutions and a political will of its own, yet its choices can still be constrained by relations between Washington and Beijing. Its people would bear the immediate consequences of a conflict whose course would depend heavily on decisions taken elsewhere.

 

China’s response to the June 2025 attacks on Iran illustrates another limit. Beijing condemned the strikes and urged de-escalation, but did not intervene militarily. It also organized the evacuation of Chinese nationals. That response was consistent with a country balancing its partnership with Tehran against wider interests in energy security, commerce, and regional stability.

 

Iran’s support for its own allies has limits as well. On October 1, 2024, Tehran launched missiles at Israel, citing, among other reasons, the killing of Hassan Nasrallah. Tehran retaliated. It did not stop Israel’s campaign against Hezbollah. The group suffered severe losses before a ceasefire took effect on November 27.

 

Lebanon has experienced the limits of outside protection in its relationship with the United States. On October 23, 1983, the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut killed 241 American service members. The American withdrawal did not follow immediately. It came as Lebanon’s political crisis deepened, the Lebanese government’s military position deteriorated, and opposition mounted in Washington. On February 7, 1984, President Ronald Reagan announced that the Marines would redeploy offshore.

 

American assistance to Lebanon, particularly to the Lebanese Armed Forces, has since been substantial and valuable. It has also served American objectives. Valuing that assistance does not oblige Lebanon to treat Washington’s priorities as its own.

 

Every partnership should therefore face the same questions: What does it strengthen? What obligations does it create? How much freedom of decision does Lebanon retain?

 

Those questions apply equally to the proposed turn east. In 2020, as Lebanon’s economy deteriorated, Hassan Nasrallah advocated Chinese investment in infrastructure. That appeal concerned economic assistance; it was not a Chinese promise to defend Lebanon. Reading a security guarantee into potential investment would turn an economic possibility into a strategic illusion.

 

Lebanon should pursue trade, investment, and diplomacy with China where they serve its interests, alongside strong Arab and Western relationships. The standard should be transparent agreements, financially sustainable projects, and respect for Lebanese sovereignty. Diversification is useful when it expands national choices. It becomes dangerous when it merely adds new forms of dependency.

 

The deeper problem, however, lies at home.

 

A country’s bargaining power depends partly on whether its government can make commitments and carry them out. Lebanon cannot establish that credibility while an armed organization outside state authority can independently take it to war. Foreign governments may negotiate with Lebanese officials, yet still doubt whether official commitments will bind every armed actor on Lebanese territory. Too often, they end up negotiating about Lebanon with others.

 

A state monopoly on legitimate force is therefore essential to credible diplomacy and national defense. It must apply to every armed organization outside lawful state authority, regardless of sect, ideology, or foreign sponsor.

 

Establishing that authority requires a Lebanese political agreement with clear responsibilities and timelines, backed by practical support for the army and other state institutions. Announcing sovereignty without acquiring the means to exercise it will not restore confidence. Nor does insisting on Lebanese responsibility excuse foreign aggression or diminish other states’ obligations to respect Lebanon’s borders and sovereignty.

 

A capable army, a productive economy, and accountable institutions would give Lebanon greater freedom to implement its decisions, withstand pressure, and negotiate. They would make it a country others have reason to work with rather than bargain over.

 

Building such a state will not eliminate every external threat. It will give Lebanon a stronger voice in decisions that shape its future.

Those who fail to build their state will always wait for someone else to protect them. Those who surrender their decision‑making to outside powers should not be surprised when their fate becomes a bargaining item on someone else’s table.

 

 

Pierre A. Maroun

Researcher and Strategic Analyst

President, Shields of United Lebanon (SOUL)